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1 Introduction
The attacks on 11 September 2001 have focussed our minds on the dangers of
transnational terrorism. Conflicts in far-flung places can now impact on the ordinary
citizens of countries that are seemingly unconnected with the quarrels that motivate
such violence. The intention of such indirect attacks is to affect people who have
influence over the powers directly involved in the dispute. It also serves to attract
attention to a conflict neglected by the media and government in influential nations.
Consequently, while bombings, hijackings, and kidnapping often cause death and
injury, they are usually intended to have a psychological impact that goes beyond the
numbers killed, and therefore measuring their intensity in terms of the number of
fatalities, as is done with other types of conflict, is problematic.
A transnational terrorist act is one that impacts on the citizenry or interests of a country
not directly part of the conflict in question. It can occur anywhere, both in the country
where the conflict is occurring or elsewhere. Thus, for example, if the USA or the west
is a target, then its citizens may be attacked in countries where the attackers are fighting
the state, such as by Jihad in Egypt or Moro separatists (Abu Sayyaf) in the Philippines.
Mainland France may be subject to attacks by the Algerian FIS. Attacks or kidnappings
can also occur in third countries, such as Malaysia; attacks on US interests can take
place in the USA (such as against the Twin Towers), or elsewhere as with the US
embassy bombings in East Africa.
In an influential paper Doran (2002) points out that transnational terrorism really
reflects a civil war taking place elsewhere. The ultimate objective of the terrorists is to
induce a backlash that will cause the masses in the country with the domestic dispute to
rise against their oppressive state. A further implication of that paper, and one that has
considerable intuitive appeal, is that the nationals or interests of the country subjected to
terrorism also represent something that is in some way a backer or ally of the real
enemy of the terrorists. Thus, when westerners are kidnapped by the FARC in
Colombia, or the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, the political aim of the kidnappers is to
target the policy of support by the west for the government that the terrorists wish to
overthrow. The interests and citizens of the United States, and its close western allies,
have become major targets for terrorist action by groups who see it as a sponsor and ally
of regimes and states that are in a real or virtual state of civil war with rebellious groups.
The USA is a major financial and military sponsor of Israel, and of other governments
in the Middle East who are disliked and violently opposed by certain opposition groups,
such as in Egypt and Jordan. The United States has become a close ally of India in the
context of the Kashmir dispute, and India has recently engaged in military cooperation
with Israel. Some groups, such as Al-Qaida at present, and Libya in the past, may
espouse a raft of multinational causes ranging from the opposition to the US military
presence in Saudi Arabia to the Israeli treatment of Palestinians, including opposition to
Indian policies in Kashmir, and in the past, support for the IRA in Northern Ireland (by
Libya and Iran in the 1980s). Transnational terrorism is not confined to the developing
world. Activities of groups such as November 17th in Greece against western targets, or
the IRA in mainland Britain are two examples.
The purpose of this paper is to model these three-way interactions in a game-theoretic
framework. The parties include a government that faces armed opposition at home; this
may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state’s opponents or rebels against2
the government’s external sponsor. This paper is concerned with the ‘demand’ side for
terrorism. There is a vast literature on terrorist interaction and negotiation with the
government affected by terrorism. Other papers are concerned with the ‘supply’ side of
terrorism; recruitment, retention, group formation and conformity, see for example,
Ferrero (2002) and Wintrobe (2002). Still others are concerned with the global anti-
terrorist deterrence burden sharing between the USA, UK, France and other western
powers, for example, Sandler and Enders (2002). However, scant attention has been
paid in the analytical modelling literature to terrorism as a spillover of a domestic
dispute involving a government, a rebel group, and an outside sponsor of the
government, as in our paper.
In section 2 we outline the model in question. We begin by positing a domestic dispute,
which for analytical convenience resembles a civil war, but could include armed
rebellion or other forms of organized violence by excluded groups, and the state’s
response to it. The government itself receives support from an external power, which we
characterize as financial aid, but this variable could also encapsulate other forms of
assistance. This aid can be utilized either to fight or appease rebels (in the latter case
through a fiscal transfer to them to reduce their level grievance, such as increased social
spending or political inclusion to redress past neglect). We model acts of appeasement
by the government through the mechanism of a financial transfer. Rebels react
‘optimally’ via strategies in connection with their interaction vis-à-vis both the
government and its external sponsor. The rebel options include optimal quantities of
fighting or peaceful efforts against their enemy at home and its external sponsor, with
terrorism directed against the latter. Both the government and the rebel (and terrorist)
sides’ strategies are defined in terms of peacefulness rather than belligerency. This,
somewhat counterintuitive, strategy-space is justified on the grounds that foreign aid (in
financing a fiscal transfer) and economic development (in reducing poverty) may
promote inclusion and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
The outside power is concerned with its own security, something that can be achieved
either through its own deterrence of terrorism, or the mechanism of aid to the
government, which is meant to be used to pacify and include the rebels (but may be
misused for fighting, which in turn may endanger the foreign power by directing rebel
attention to it). To avoid excessive complication, we rule out direct foreign military
assistance to the government. Just as there will be governments who are prone to
belligerency or more inclined to appease the rebels, the rebels too can be of a more or
less militant type. The former type nurses a deep historical sense of grievance and
collective humiliation (see Lindner 2001 on humiliation in general and violent
expressions of collective humiliation). They will not be easily deterred, as they are
strongly imbued with an intrinsic motivation to fight, and instead they will respond to
acts of deterrence with greater militancy. The latter (less militant) type of terrorist
group’s motivation resembles criminality, and that is something that can be more
readily deterred. Section 3 is concerned with non-cooperative behaviour and parameter
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For the government, income (Y
G) is composed of an exogenous component and a
variable foreign aid (A) part. The parameter, A, captures aid from a foreign power or
sponsor (S) which can be used either for fighting the rebels (F) or for peaceful transfers.
T is a transfer to the rebel group, which assuages their grievance. A full and credible
transfer only takes place in the peaceful state, otherwise it is given with imperfect
credibility (λ < 1) in the state of conflict. The transfer can mean several things:
increased (broad-based) public expenditure, inclusion in government jobs, power
sharing and voice in the decision-making process. Generally speaking, it is the
pecuniary value of including the excluded.
Note that strategies for the government and rebels are in terms of peaceful behaviour, so
a, e and t raise chances of peace, π. C refers to the cost of undertaking a by the state,
Ca > 0. The superscripts P and C refer to states of peace and war, respectively. Even the
peaceful state is associated with military expenditure (i.e., a state of armed peace). The
rebels too do not entirely disarm, although this assumption can be changed without
affecting the results of the model.
The parameter µ denotes the relative fighting efficiency of the government over the
rebels. In other words, it approximates the contest success functions favoured by all
theorists of conflict (see Hirshleifer 1995, for example). Normally, contest success
functions in the context of civil war are a ratio of military spending by one side relative
to total military expenditure, weighted by decisiveness or a fighting efficiency
parameter. Here we focus on the latter aspect, pure military effectiveness, as fighting
expenditure is a function of available resources, including aid.1 In equation (2) G
P and
G
C correspond to budget constraints in the two states.
It is instructive to examine the government’s strategic variable. Totally differentiating,
a, the government’s strategic choice variable:
                                                
1 The military effectiveness of the government against the rebels could include not only conventional
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All the partial derivatives in (3) are positive. Aid (A) is part of the income of the
government, and it can be utilized either to increase transfers to the rebels or fight them.
Therein lies a trade-off; thus the term in square brackets in (3) is ambiguous in sign. The
second term on the right-hand side of (3) is negative, because a rise in the relative
fighting efficiency of the state causes it to be less peaceful. For a type 1 or good
government, the first term is positive; it prefers peace.
Given exogenous payoffs in the two states of peace (P) and conflict (C), the government
will maximize (1) with respect to a:
a
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Essentially, this means that the government equates the marginal utility of its strategic
action (a) on the left-hand side of (4) with the marginal cost on the right-hand side.
2.2 Rebels (R) who are also terrorists against the government’s external sponsor
The rebel objective or utility function takes the following form:
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R) for the rebel group is exogenous, and R
P and R
C describe their budget
constraints. The rebel group choice’s surround e (effort with regard to peace with the
state) and t (the inverse of terrorism against the government’s foreign sponsor).
E describes the cost function for undertaking e and t, with Ee, Et > 0. F
R represents
fighting against the government.  Here  θ denotes historical hatred and intrinsic
motivation to fight the state, and D represents deterrence against terrorism engaged in
by the outside power. F
S denotes terrorist acts against the foreign sponsor of the
government. If  0 , 0 > < D
S
D t F , then deterrence works, it reduces terrorism and vice
versa. We will allow these signs to vary, for different (easily deterred and militant)
types of rebel or terrorist groups in the analysis that follows. There is no terrorism in the
peaceful state, as the rebels have no reason to attack the government’s external backer.5
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The first term on the right-hand side of (7) is positive, e rises with T, but falls with θ and
µ. In other words, transfers from the state raise peaceful behaviour, but a rise in intrinsic
motivation and the government’s fighting efficiency lower peaceful behaviour by the
rebels towards the state.
? , 0 , d d d D µ D µ t t D t µ t t < + =  (8)
Equation (8) implies the rebels engage in less terrorism (the inverse of t) against the
outside sponsor of the state the more profitably they fight inside the country versus the
state. Increases in the government’s fighting efficiency, however, induce more terrorism
against ‘soft’ or hard overseas targets belonging to the state’s external sponsor, the first
term on the right-hand side of (8). Deterrence reduces terrorism against the sponsor if
0 > D t , which is not always the case.
As with the government, the payoffs to the rebels are exogenous, and the rebel group
will maximize (4) with respect to e and t:
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The rebel group thus equates the marginal benefit of e and t with their respective
marginal costs.
2.3 Outside sponsor (S) of the government
The outside sponsor is interested in its own security which can be achieved by giving
aid to the government that will induce the type 1 (‘good’/peace-preferring) government
to increase transfers and appease the rebels. The object of the aid is to increase peaceful
behaviour amongst the parties to the civil war. If, however, the government utilizes aid
to increase its fighting effort against the rebels, the rebels will turn against the outside
sponsor via acts of terrorism at home and abroad (including in third countries).
Alternatively, the external power may use deterrence to emasculate the terrorist
activities of the rebels. Consider the following form for the utility or security production
function of the external power:
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The security function (S) of the sponsor rises with peaceful behaviour (a and e) by the
government and rebel side to the domestic dispute. It is a reduced form of the6
government and rebel utility functions. Peacefulness may be induced via the mechanism
of aid to the government, which can result in greater a and e if aid causes the transfer, T,
to be affected. Deterrence (D) will work if it reduces terrorism by the rebels (raises t)
and  γ is a shift parameter in the perceived value of deterrence. It includes actions
proscribing the activities and finances of the rebels, as well as military action. Z is a cost
function for the two choices of the sponsor, aid and deterrence. It is a priori unclear
whether aid or deterrence is costlier per unit.
Maximizing (11) with respect to A, we obtain:
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This means that the marginal benefit of aid in terms of peaceful action by the two sides
to the domestic dispute is equated to the marginal cost of giving aid. Note that the
parameters, Aa and Ae may be evaluated from (3) and (7) above setting dµ, dθ = 0. It
means that the marginal benefit of aid is positive only for that variety of government
that prefers peace (the type 1 government for whom the sum of the first term on the
right-hand side of (3) is positive). Thus, there is a potential adverse selection problem
here. Alternatively, and more realistically, there is a signalling or reputational problem
associated with guessing the type of government.
Turning now to optimal deterrence levels we find:
0 , > = D D t D Z Z D S γ  (13)
This is positive only if Dt > 0, and deterrence works by lowering terrorism (the inverse
of t). If Dt< 0, then the expression on the left-hand of (13) is negative, and the optimal
level of deterrence is zero. We will argue that this is dependent on the beliefs of the
external power regarding the efficacy of deterrence. So, we have two sets of alternative
types here in connection with the effect of deterrence on terrorism. First, for the more
committed rebels (militants) tD < 0, increased deterrence hardens their will to strike at
the external sponsor of their domestic enemy. The converse holds for the more readily
deterred rebels. We could also argue that the sign of tD alters as the quantity of
deterrence is increased. Second, as regards the outside power, there is the possibility
that their beliefs are that deterrence always works by diminishing terrorism (hawks),2 as
well as a chance that they are more cautious regarding the efficacy of deterrence
(doves). For the former group Dt > 0, and vice versa for the doves. Those who believe
that deterrence works might be motivated by their own sense of morality or their desire
to pre-empt and strike first against terrorism. In conformity with current reality, we will
assume that the external power is hawkish, believing in the efficacy of deterrence, more
D raises t (the opposite of terrorism), thus Dt is always positive.
2.4 Model solution and the game form
The game follows three stages:
                                                
2 For example, some of the more hawkish members of the present US administration.7
(1) The external sponsor of the government chooses A and D, given conjectures or
beliefs about the government and the rebel types. In forming the conjecture about
the government’s type (peaceful or warlike), two possible classes of problems arise.
The first is adverse selection regarding the type of government, associated with aid
giving (see Murshed and Sen 1995). The outside donor will have to meet its client’s
participation constraint, and aid cannot be below the recipient’s reservation utility.
The sponsor will also need to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint of the
government so as to make it truthfully reveal its true type and carry out the function
(make the transfer to the rebels) which is the quid pro quo for aid. But because the
task following the granting of aid is not enforceable, the incentive compatibility
constraint does not actually bind the recipient government to carry out its side of the
bargain. Even when the aid-donor relationship is repeated over time, there are still
incentives for the government to deviate from conditionality. Therefore, the donor
has to make a prior guess about the government’s reputation, based on past
behaviour. We will not explicitly analyse its priors about government and rebel
types, see Addison and Murshed (2002) for an analysis of credibility and reputation
in the context of peacemaking following a civil war. If the donor (foreign power)
thinks it is a type 2 (warlike) government, aid may not be given.3 But the game will
still proceed as the government and the rebels are still at loggerheads, and choose
optimal fighting strategies with possible terrorism implications. There are no
problems of agency, associated with the government’s choice of deterrence against
the rebels, as no quid pro quo is involved. All that matters is the external power’s
beliefs about the efficacy or morality of deterrence; we assert that they believe
deterrence reduces terrorism.
(2) In stage 2, after the choice of A and D by the sponsor, the government and the rebels
choose, a, e and t simultaneously, given θ, µ. The government and the rebels interact
in a Cournot-Nash fashion with strategies in a and e. If the government makes a full
and credible transfer to the rebels, then a and e is maximized and there is peace.
(3) In the absence of a fully credible transfer we move to stage 3, the outside sponsor
reacts to the rebel group’s choice of t with D, with the external power and the
terrorists interacting non-cooperatively in D and t.
3 Comparative statics
In order to analyse variations in parameters, we first need to obtain two sets of reaction
functions in (a, e) and (D, t) space to capture government-rebel and sponsor-terrorist
interaction.
3.1 Reaction functions
Equations (4) and (9) form the basis of the reaction functions for the government and
the rebels, obtained by totally differentiating them with respect to a and e. Thus:
                                                
3 Under uncertainty about the recipient’s type, the donor might still wish to give aid to the government
knowing it to be belligerent, if it wants to maximize the slim likelihood of aid being effective in
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Note that π ae = π ea by symmetry. Also even though π a, π e > 0, π aa, π ee < 0, meaning





We assume that the two strategies are complements,  . 0 > ae π  In other words more
peaceful action or warlike behaviour by one side leads to the same by the other. The
reaction functions will be positively sloped in Figure 1.
Figure 1














As far as the outside sponsor and the rebels who are now terrorists are concerned, their
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In (16) there are diminishing returns to deterrence, Dtt < 0, holding the other argument
(aid) in the security function constant, the denominator is negative. Also ZDD > 0. The
reaction function for the outside power will be negatively sloped as long as the foreign
government believes that deterrence reduces terrorism (the converse of t). In (17),
πtt < 0, there are diminishing returns to the strategy, t, and Ett > 0. If the rebel (or
terrorist) group is militant, more external deterrence will lead to its increasing its
terrorist activities, πtD < 0, and the reaction function will be negatively sloped, as in
Figure 2. For the more easily deterred type of rebels, the reaction functions are
positively sloped. We will concentrate on cases where the external sponsor is hawkish,
and the terrorists are militant.
Figure 2















3.2 An increase in the government’s fighting efficiency (a rise in µ)
There are a variety of reasons for an increase in the government’s capabilities against
the rebels. One reason is an increase in its willingness to strike at the rebels, despite
human rights implications, or because it perceives that it will attract less opprobrium in
the international community. As noted earlier, fighting the rebels includes torture,
incarceration and interrogation, in addition to conventional warfare.
In Figure 1 the reaction function of the government 
G R1  shifts leftwards to 
G R2 , as there
is less incentive to be peaceful (a) for each level of e, see equations (1)-(3). A similar
line of reasoning applies to the rebels, see equations (5) to (7), and the rebel reaction10
functions shift down from 
R R1  to 
R R2 . The new equilibrium will have shifted from A to
point B in Figure 1 with a decline in both a and e, but a greater decline in a relative to e.
This is because there will be an increase in terrorist activity (decline in t), see equation
(8). In Figure 2 the rebel reaction functions move down from 
t R1  to 
t R2. But the external
power will want greater deterrence, and hence its reaction function moves up from 
S R1
to 
S R2 . Once again the new equilibrium is at point B in Figure 2 with greater D and
lower t (more terrorist attacks against the outside sponsor). In summary an increase in
the government’s fighting efficiency or determination to strike at the rebels raises both
rebel fighting against the government and more terror-type attacks against the external
sponsor’s interests within the budget constraint of the rebel group.
3.3 An increase in the cost of peaceful effort amongst the rebels (a rise in Ee)
This represents a decline in the cost of peaceful effort (Ee) against the state, relative to
the outside sponsor from (9) and (10). This means that for the rebels it pays more to
fight the state, and increase their peacefulness vis-à-vis the outside sponsor. It could be
caused by increased political weakness within the government, or a fall in the cost of
undertaking military action against the state. In Figure 3 the slope of their budget
constraint shifts from the budget line indicated by 1 to 2. From point A, the new
equilibrium could be at point such as B in Figure 3, with less terrorism (lower t).
Figure 3







3.4 An increase in the cost of terrorist activities (a fall in Et)
This means that terrorist acts are more expensive, Et has declined and less t will be
chosen. Analytically, Figure 3 applies, and the budget line shifts from 1 to 2, and more t
is chosen at point B. The rebels may re-direct their belligerence towards their domestic
foes.
It has to be borne in mind that deterrence is direct, involving for example, proscription,
seizing funds, facilities, bans and outright war on terrorists. Raising the cost of terrorism
(lowering  Et) is indirect, and often impacts on others such as bankers and arms
merchants; it raises the price of intermediate inputs into terrorism, such as making
weapons more expensive, raising difficulties of accessing offshore funds and so on. The
distinction between deterrence and raising the cost of terrorism is not at all clear cut.
Seizing or proscribing the sources of the finance of terrorism may only be a temporary
inconvenience to the rebel group, as powerfully motivated political causes imbued with
a deep sense of humiliation will always find new sources of finance. This is different
from attempting to halt the flow of finance associated with civil wars that are essentially
contests over resource rents, such as the revenues associated with conflict diamonds in
Angola and Sierra Leone (see Addison, Le Billon and Murshed 2001).
Economic development and income growth shifts up the budget line in Figure 3, and
causes more peaceful behaviour overall towards both internal and external opponents.
This argument also applies to the government side. Higher income levels encourage the
peaceful resolution of disputes, as the opportunity cost of violence increases with wealth
and the various parties to the dispute may become more risk averse. Furthermore, the
country becomes more interdependent with the outside world in terms of finance and
trade, and has much more to lose from war with other countries (see Polachek 2002).
3.5 A rise in rebel intrinsic motivation to fight the state (θ)
A rise in the intrinsic motivation to fight the state by the rebels could arise because of
acts of brutality or torture or some other misdeed by the government towards the rebels.
It will shift the rebel reaction function down in Figure 1 indicating less e, and more
fighting against the state at point C. Rebel activities against the state’s external sponsor
will, however, decline. This is indicated by an upward movement in the rebel reaction
function in Figure 2, and the final equilibrium is at point C with less deterrence and
terrorism (more t).
3.6 A rise in relative cost of giving aid to the government (ZA)
The new government in the country with the domestic dispute may be less amenable to
implementing the bidding of the donor and the conditionality associated with aid (A). It
also may be more belligerent and inclined to fight the rebels. This is often the case
following a military coup. Then aid is less effective in reducing conflict, and the
credibility of any transfer to the rebels is lower. Analytically Figure 3 applies, the
budget line rotates from (1) to (2). The external sponsor is compelled to employ more
deterrence at a point like B in Figure 3. There will be greater violence, both in the
intrastate civil war and transnational terrorism contexts.12
3.7 A more conservative (hawkish) outside sponsor (γ)
The election of a conservative government, such as a Republican administration in the
USA, means that these conservatives may derive a greater marginal utility from
combating terrorism. We depict this in our model as an increase in the shift parameter γ
in (11). Also events such as those of 11 September 2001, may outrage the public in the
foreign country and can raise γ . The sponsor’s reaction function 
S R1  shifts out to 
S R2
along 
t R1  indicating a greater preference for deterrence, D, for every level of t  in
Figure  4. At this juncture the ‘terrorists’ type matters. If the group is more easily
deterred, then the reaction function is upward sloping (not shown in Figure 2). This sort
of motivation may be applicable to the less ideologically ardent, and more bandit-like
terrorists. It can be argued, however, that for a deeply humiliated rebel group only a
very high level of deterrence will cause them to reduce armed struggle. Thus we may
posit, that rebels react to increases in deterrence, when the overall stock of deterrence
against them is low with more violence, relenting only at very high levels of
proscription. Thus, in Figure 4 the terrorist reaction function is first negative (recall
more t means less terror), and then becomes positive after a discontinuity. The external
sponsor may increase deterrence, but it may not work in reducing acts of terror; at point
B, t has fallen meaning more terrorist acts against the outside power. Deterrence works
at only very high levels, beyond point C in Figure 4,4 which may be very expensive or
Figure 4












                                                
4 This implies a discontinuity in the rebels or terrorists reaction function: 
t R1 .13
not acceptable to the citizenry of the foreign sponsor unless there is a 11 September type
attack. This result has resonance with Wintrobe’s (2002) paper on terrorist motivation.
He argues that small changes in ‘relative prices’, deterrence in our model, will not deter
terrorists in undertaking acts such as suicide bombing. Similarly, Frey and Lüchinger
(2002) argue that deterrence may backfire and lead to greater acts of violence.
A policy implication that arises from our result, and the work of Frey and Lüchinger
(2002), as well as Wintrobe (2002), is the desirability of the reduction of the collective
humiliation (long-standing political grievances) that causes terrorism. Basically this
means the political and economic resolution of the problems that are at the root of
terrorism, civil war and domestic disputes in developing countries; see, Murshed (2002)
on the breakdown of the social contract that leads to civil war, and the necessity of
reconstructing it if peace is to be durable.
4 Conclusions
We have modelled transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving
a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of
acts of terrorism by the state’s opponents against the government’s external sponsor.
We believe this to be a true reflection of much of present day terrorism, see also Doran
(2002). There is also a widespread belief amongst many observers that many of today’s
terrorist groups, especially Islamic ones, possess deep intrinsic motivation born of a
long standing and deep sense of collective humiliation. If that is the case, then increased
deterrence towards them may only serve to harden their resolve to fight on (see
Wintrobe 2002). Reducing their willingness to strike, at the equally loathed domestic
government and its foreign sponsor, will require an enormous amount of retaliation and
deterrence; levels that may be unacceptable to the nationals of the external power,
barring events such as on 11 September 2001. Also increases in the government’s
ability to fight or persecute the rebels could lead to a global and general increase in
violence. Increasing the cost of intermediate inputs into terrorism, such as increasing
scrutiny on offshore banking, may have the desired effect, but only temporarily.
Motivated rebel and terrorist groups are extremely innovative in raising finance for their
war efforts, and the use of the hawala  system of informal international financial
transfers is highly effective and difficult to police (see Addison, Le Billon and Murshed
2001).
We have shown that purely military solutions can backfire. The real solutions to
terrorism lie in the economic and political spheres. This means raising economic growth
(and reducing macroeconomic instability) so that incomes and employment
opportunities increase, thereby reducing the frustrations of young unemployed males
who are otherwise ready recruits for terrorist organizations. Also, increased economic
interdependence with the outside world through formal trade etc. generally induces
peace (Polachek 2002). Political action is needed at two levels, involving the removal of
exclusion and humiliation. Conflict and open civil war often emerge because of the
breakdown of the social contract, that is the peaceful way of resolving disputes, and a
just, as well as inclusive system of distributing power and economic resources (Murshed
2002). After all, the main quarrel the terrorists have is with their venal and
unrepresentative governments. Thus, it is essential to rebuild the social contract to
remove terrorism long-term. Furthermore, many societies and groups are willing to go14
to great lengths and to sacrifice themselves out of a sense of deep humiliation (see
Lindner 2001 on this). Addressing these issues are equally important to a permanent
solution to terrorism; economists, rational choice theorists and policymakers ignore this
deep motivation at their own peril.
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